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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 42, NO. 3
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ToRT LiABILITY FOR GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTIONS-HolytZ v. City of Milwaukee (Wisconsin 1962)..
I. ABROGATION OF MUNICIPAL TORT IMMUNITY
An infant was injured because of the negligent maintenance
of a drinking fountain in a playground operated by the city of
Milwaukee. The infant girl's father brought this action against the
municipal corporation of Milwaukee for the personal injuries
sustained by her, plus consequential damages resulting from such
injuries. The Circuit Court of Milwaukee County sustained the
city's demurrer, and the plaintiff appealed. Held, reversed for the
plaintiff, granting recovery against the municipality for negligence
in the exercise of a governmental function.' This decision thus
overruled all Wisconsin case law which previously denied recovery
against a municipal corporation for torts committed in the exercise
of a governmental function.2
The opinion of the Wisconsin court is of interest and significance
primarily because of the almost unanimous disapproval among
legal scholars and writers of the present governmental-proprietary
distinctions (under which a municipal corporation is liable if its
agent is negligent in the performance of a proprietary function,
but is not liable if the negligence occurred in the performance of
a governmental function). This decision may indicate the direction
I Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618 (Wis. 1962). This decision
does not alter the present status of an employee's or agent's liability. It
merely holds that when the agent is liable, the doctrine of respondeat
superior applies, thus granting liability against the municipal corpo-
ration.
2 Hayes v. City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314, 14 Am. Rep. 760 (1873) (initiated
doctrine of governmental immunity in Wisconsin).
3 Serious attention was early focused on the problem of tort immunity by
a series of essays written by Professor Edwin M. Borchard. See Borchard,
Governmental Liability in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927).
For a study of the status of tort immunity in the various states see
Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363
(1954). Among the more cogent criticisms of the current situation are:
Fordham & Pegues, Local Government Responsibility in Tort in Louisi-
ana, 3 LA. L. REV. 720 (1941); Green, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38
ILL. L. REV. 355 (1944); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corpora-
tions, 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921); Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for
Torts in Minnesota, 26 MmN. L. REV. 293, 700, 854 (1942); Price & Smith,
Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6 FLA. L. REV. 330
(1953); Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Govern-
mental or Proprietary Test, 22 VA. L. REV. 910 (1936); Tooke, The Ex-
tension of Municipal Liability in Tort, 19 VA. L. REV. 97 (1932); Note,
12 RUTGErS L. REV. 526 (1958).
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courts of other states will take in an area of the law that is ripe
for judicial change.
The concept of governmental immunity had its beginning in
the case of Russel v. Men of Devon,4 which held that an individual
could not maintain an action against an unincorporated county for
its negligent maintenance of a bridge. This decision was improperly
applied to an incorporated town in an early Massachusetts case,
and gained widespread acceptance from its adoption in Bailey
v: Mayor of the City of New York.6 In its application the doctrine
ha produced some bizarre results. Recovery has been allowed or
refused on the basis of distinctions inconsistent with any system
of justice or logic.7 There is hardly a legal doctrine so universally
criticized as municipal tort immunity, which is at the same time so
universally followed by the courts. At the present time the courts
of all but three states still grant at least partial immunity for gov-
ernmental functions.8 Only Florida, in a 1957 decision, Hargrove v.
Town of Cocoa Beach,9, and California, in a 1961 decision, Muskopf
v. Corning Hospital District,o have preceded the Wisconsin court
in completely abolishing municipal tort immunity.
42 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
5 Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812).
6.3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
71n Florida the courts have held maintenance of a fire department, police
department, jails, and traffic signals to be governmental functions. Yet
it is held that the operation of an incinerator, collection of garbage,
operation of a hospital and the maintenance of streets are proprietary
functions. Such distinctions hardly seem to be based on any abstract
notions of justice. Cases making these distinctions respectively are:
Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 87 Fla. 117, 100 So. 150 (1924); Kennedy v.
Daytona Bebach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938); Williams v. City of
Green Coveb Springs, 65 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1953); Avey v. West Palm
Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 So. 2d 881 (1943) ; Chardkoff Junk Co. v. Tampa,
102 Fla. 501, 135 So. 457 (1931); Smoak v. Tampa, 123 Fla. 716, 167 So.
528 (1936); Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. 2d 721 (1942); Ballard
v. Tampa, 124 Fla. 457, 168 So. 654 (1936).
s Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. RE V. 1363-
1415 (1954). New York has, however, in effect abolished governmental
immunity by statute. N.Y. COURT OF CLAims ACT § 8 (1939); Bernadine
v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945). In South
Carolina a municipal corporation is immune from tort liability com-
pletely, even for proprietary functions, except where liability is imposed
by statute. Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911).
9 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
10 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
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II. SCOPE OF ABROGATION
The scope of the decision in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee can
best be summed up by the court's own words:"
[H]enceforward, so far as governmental responsibility for torts is
concerned, the rule is liability-the exception is immunity. In deter-
mining the tort liability of a municipality it is no longer necessary
to divide its operations into those which are proprietary and those
which are governmental.
On the facts of Holytz alone, the holding would have to be
limited to a municipal corporation. However, the court, by dicta,
clearly indicated that: 12
The case at bar relates specifically to a city; however, we consider
that abrogation of the doctrine applies to all public bodies within
the state: the state, counties, cities, villages, towns, school districts,
sewer districts, drainage districts, and any other political subdi-
visions of the state-whether they be incorporated or not. By reason
of the rule of respondeat superior a public body shall be liable
for damages for the torts of its officers, agents and employees
occurring in the course of the business of such public body.
Thus this court, while specifically abolishing municipal tort
immunity only, concludes that all governmental immunity at and
below the state level should be abrogated. Whether the Wisconsin
courts will take the obvious step of extending the abrogation
beyond municipal corporations, however, remains to be seen. This
issue has not yet been decided in either Florida or California under
subsequent interpretations of Hargrove or Muskopf.
Holytz also extended liability to torts, whether of commission
or omission.13 In so doing, the court indicated that any commission-
omission distinction was unjustified and as such should be disre-
garded.
The court did make clear, however, that its decision to abolish
governmental immunity would not alter any constitutional pro-
vision preserving the state's sovereign right to be immune from
suit. Nor would it impose liability on a governmental body in the
exercise of its legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial
functions. 14 These remaining bases of immunity are deeply in-
grained within the principles of our constitution 15 and tort law0
11 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (Wis. 1962).
12 Id. at 625.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Cases collected in 49 Am. Jura. States § 91 (1943).
16 PROSSER, TORTS § 109 at 780 (2d ed. 1955).
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respectively, and are based on public policy considerations entirely
different from those involved in the governmental-proprietary
distinction.17 There is much confusion regarding the distinction
between the procedural immunity of a state provided in its con-
stitution and the substantive immunity municipalities and other
governing bodies have acquired as a result of the governmental-
proprietary distinction. The tendency of lawyers and courts to look
upon them as one and the same, has led to the opinion in some
cases that when a state did consent to be sued, this fact alone
was evidence of its liability.'8 This is clearly not the case, how-
ever. A state's act of consenting to be sued is not an admission
of liability per se, but merely leaves a claim open for settlement by
the courts.19 It is clear from Holytz that even after substantive tort
immunity has been abolished, a plaintiff must still meet all the
procedural requirements of the various state constitutions for
bringing suit against a state or an agent of the state.
As the court in Holytz indicated,20 they did not, by their holding,
interpret that state's legislative provision which authorizes suit
against the state in accordance with article IV, section 27 of the
Wisconsin Constitution. The statute authorizing suit against the
state in Wisconsin provides: 21
Upon the refusal of the legislature to allow a claim against the
state the claimant may commence an action against the state by
serving the summons and complaint on the attorney-general or by
leaving copies at his office and by filing with the clerk of court a
bond, not exceeding $1,000, with two or more sureties, to be ap-
proved by the attorney-general, to the effect that he will indemnify
the state against all costs that may accrue in such action and pay to
the clerk of court all costs, in case he shall fail to obtain judgment
against the state.
In spite of the broad language of the statute, the court indicated
17 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961).
In Muskopf the court indicated that the governmental immunity abol-
ished did not include any immunity based on the state's sovereign right
to be free from suit as provided by article XX, § 6 of that state's con-
stitution, and that article XX, § 6 merely provided for legislative consent
for the state to be sued.
18 Id. at 217, 359 P.2d at 460, 461.
19 Ibid.
20 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis. 1962).
21WIS. STAT. ANN. § 285.01 (1958); Wis. CONST. art. IV § 27 (1957) provides
that the "legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what
courts suit may be brought against the state."
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that in view of an old Wisconsin case22 construing the statute, there
was at least some doubt that a suit could be procedurally maintained
against an agent of the state. The court in Holytz did recognize,
however, that they would subsequently have to face this issue.23
Recognizing this fact, it would seem ludicrous for a court to over-
throw a doctrine adhered to by a preponderance of jurisdictions,
if it did not likewise intend to overturn an equally hard-to-justify
statutory interpretation in its own jurisdiction which would com-
pletely cancel the effectiveness of its own decision.
The legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial
immunity for governing bodies which Holytz retains would still
grant immunity to governing bodies and their officials who exer-
cise "discretionary '24 functions in the performance of their duties.
This immunity would extend to such situations as the following:
state legislators carrying out their legislative functions;25 judges
making judicial pronouncements;26 a city's enforcement of an
unconstitutional ordinance; 27 an assessor evaluating property for
taxes;28 acts of a prosecuting attorney in connection with an in-
dictment;2 9 and a school board dismissing a pupil.80 All these acts
are still to remain immune from liability even if done wrongfully,
so long as they are performed in good faith.8 '
22Houston v. State, 98 Wis. 481, 74 N.W. 111 (1898) (action cannot be
maintained against the state for damages for the wrongful and tortious
destruction of plaintiff's property by its officers under color of police
regulations duly passed by the legislature).
23 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis. 1962).
24 PROSSER, TORTS § 109 at 780-83 (2d ed. 1955).
2 5 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
26 Brictson v. Woodrough, 164 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1947); Fletcher v. Wheat,
100 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1938); Broom v. Douglass, 175 Ala. 268, 57 So. 860(1912); Webb v. Fisher, 109 Tenn. 701, 72 S.W. 110 (1903).27Elrod v. City of Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 23, 180 So. 378 (1938).
2 8Balerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447, 23 Pac. 530 (1890); Stewart v. Case,
53 Minn. 62, 54 N.W. 938 (1893); Harmer v. Petersen, 151 Neb. 412, 37
N.W.2d 511 (1949) (road overseer); Fawcet v. Dole, 67 N.H. 168, 29
Atl. 693 (1892); Nadeau v. Marchessault, 112 Vt. 309, 24 A.2d 352 (1942)(overseer of poor).
29Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926); Griffith v. Slinkard, 146 Ind.
117, 44 N.E. 1001 (1896); Kittler v. Kelsch, 56 N.D. 227, 216 N.W. 898(1927); Watts v. Gerking, 111 Ore. 641, 222 Pac. 318 (1924). See gen-
erally Note, 12 Alum. L. REV. 665 (1928).
30 Gibson v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir. 1949); Wilson v. Hirst, 67
Ariz. 197, 193 P.2d 461 (1948) (hospital board discharging employee);
Sweeney v. Young, 82 N.H. 159, 131 Atl. 155 (1925).
31 McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263, 35 Am. Rep. 163 (1880); Rehmann v. City
of Des Moines, 204 Iowa 798, 215 N.W. 957 (1927); Roerig v. Houghton,
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A Very important question which Holytz seemingly leaves un-
-resolved is whether that court has incorporated into its decision all
the limitations on liability adopted by Hargrove, or, if not all,
specifically which ones. In Hargrove, a case which undoubtedly
served as a precedent for Holytz, the court limited municipal lia-
bility to direct personal injury received while the municipality's
agent was acting within the scope of his employment, 2 and not
while engaged in the performance of an ultra vires act.38 The
language of Holytz definitely indicates that whatever acts are "with-
in the course of business"84 are the only acts for which the munici-
pality will be held liable. If all the present limitations of Hargrove
become incorporated into Holytz, it would mean that a tort victim
could not recover either for negligence or an intentional tort if
the tortious official had exceeded the authority of his office.3 5 One
Florida lower~court interpreting Hargrove held that a policeman's
intentional tort committed while on duty was ultra vires within the
meaning of Hargrove merely because the municipal corporation did
not authorize the tortious act or have authority to do so.36 The most
serious limitation of Hargrove, however, is that the lower courts in
Florida have subsequently interpreted the decision to allow re-
covery against a municipality only when an official has been
negligent in the performance of his duty, but not when he com-
mits an intentional tort in pursuance of his duties 3 7 Such an inter-
pretation seems unfortunate and contradicts some very explicit
language to the contrary in Hargrove itself.38 Another Florida
court held that a municipality is not liable for a policeman's
144 Minn. 231, 175 N.W. 542 (1919); State ex rel. Robertson v. oFarmers
State Bank, 162 Tenn. 499, 39 S.W.2d 281 (1931).
32 Kennedy v. Daytona Beach, 132 Fla. 675, 182 So. 228 (1938).
33 City of Miami v. Bethel, 63 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1953); City of Orlando v.
Pragg, 31 Fla. 111, 12 So. 2d 368 (1893). See generally 52 Am. JuR. Towns
§ 41 (1944).
34 See note 12 supra.
35 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
36 City of Coral Gables v. Giblin, 127 So. 2d 914 (Fla. 1961) (policeman
made illegal arrest outside city boundary, causing immediate wrong-
ful imprisonment of plaintiff).
37 Gordon: v. City of Belle 7Glade, 132 So. 2d 449, 454 (Fla. 1961) (dictum);iddleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1959).
38 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957). The court stated: "Under the rule we
hav6 followed, if a police officer assaults and injures a prisoner, the
municipality is immuine, but if the police officer is working the prisoner
on the public streets and negligently permits his injury, the municipality
can be held liable* If the police officer is driving an automobile and
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malicious arrest because such an act is quasi-judicial3 9 and, there-
fore, specifically exempted from liability under Hargrove. It was
even feared that the Florida courts might seize upon the "direct
personal injury" language used in Hargrove and exclude liability
for property damage.40 However, it is clear that such an injudicious
limitation as this has not been imposed upon Hargrove.41
The lower courts in Florida have largely disregarded the seem-
ingly obvious intent of Hargove and have limited it to as narrow a
holding as the facts will allow. In addition, it seems that Florida
courts may even further limit Hargove by adopting strict interpre-
tations of agency law, and by giving a liberal interpretation to acts
which are to be considered legislative or judicial, and as such
remain immune.42
It would seem unfortunate if Holytz subsequently undergoes
the judicial limitations which Hargrove experienced, but it would
not be entirely unexpected in view of the judicial history of the
latter case. In addition, the results achieved under Hargrove have in
some respects closely paralleled the statutory precedent of the
Federal Tort Claims Act.43
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MUNICIPAL TORT IMMUNITY
In jurisdictions which adhere to the doctrine of governmental
immunity for municipalities there is much sentiment, if not legal
pronouncement, in favor of holding such immunity unconstitu-
negligently injures a citizen, the municipality is liable but if the same
officer gets out of the same automobile and wrongfully assaults a
citizen, the municipality is immune from responsibility. We have men-
tioned these incongruities in the application of the immunization doctrine
in Florida merely to justify the position which we take here, that the
time has arrived to face this matter squarely in the interest of justice
and place the responsibility for wrongs where it should be." Despite
this language, Hargrove is interpreted as not granting liability for in-
tentional torts.
39 Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1959).
4 0 Note, 12 RUTGERS L. REV. 526 (1958).
41 Hewit v. Venable, 109 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1959).
42 Middleton v. City of Fort Walton Beach, 113 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1959).
43 In addition to the precedent of Hargrove, a court wishing to restrict the
application of Holytz could reason by analogy from the limitations of
liability imposed by statute in suits against the federal government.
Cf. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS AcT, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402, 2401, 2402, 2411
2412, 2671-80 (1958); Gellhorn & Schenk, Tort Actions Against the
Federal Government, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 722 (1947).
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tional.44 Challenges have usually been on the basis of state constitu-
tional provisions45 such as Nebraska's article I, section 13, which pro-
vides: "All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without
denial or delay." A literal interpretation of constitutional provi-
sions such as this would seem to demand that governmental im-
munity be abrogated. However, such is generally not the case. A
negligent or intentional act is not always regarded as an injury
or wrong in comprehension of the law, or in terms such as the
constitutions comprehend. Many acts result in actual harm, but
for public policy reasons the law regards them as being damnum
absque injuria, and, in effect, they are legally injury without
wrong.46 The reasoning adopted by the Nebraska Supreme Court
in a charitable immunities case, Muller v. Methodist Hospital ,4
would deny the possibility of holding governmental immunity
unconstitutional under any state constitutional provision similar
to that in Nebraska. In affirming the constitutionality of charitable
immunity under article I, section 13 of the Nebraska Constitution,
the court stated: 48
This provision of the Constitution does not create any new right
but is merely a declaration of a general fundamental principle. It
is a primary duty of the courts to safeguard this declaration of
right and remedy but where no right of action is given or remedy
exists, under either the common law or some statute, this constitu-
tional provision creates none.
It might be argued that this opinion ignores the plain words
of the constitution. The court is in effect arguing that a tort com-
mitted by a charity is regarded as damnum absque injuria at
common law, and that therefore it is likewise no constitutional
wrong. There is no question but that a tortious act by a munici-
pality is by definition a wrong. The question is then whether
article I, section 13 comprehends actual wrongs, or only wrongs as
recognized by the common law. In Hanks v. City of Port Arthur,49
the only case holding governmental immunity unconstitutional, the
court assumed that a municipality's tort injured the plaintiff within
the meaning of a Texas constitutional provision almost identical
44 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957).
45 Pullen v. Eugene, 77 Ore. 320, 146 Pac. 822 (1915).
4 0 PROSSER, TORTS § 109 (2d ed. 1955).
47 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955).
48 Muller v. Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 280, 70 N.W.2d 86, 87 (1955).
49 121 Tex. 196, 48 S.W.2d 944 (1932).
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to Nebraska's article I, section 13. Hanks is probably distinguishable
from Muller v. Methodist Hospital, however. In Hanks a statute
created municipal liability under certain conditions, and it was
the conditions of the statute which were held unconstitutional
rather than the doctrine of immunity.
None of the three cases thus far abolishing governmental im-
munity have done so on the basis of constitutional provisions similar
to Nebraska's. In Holytz and Muskopf the issue was not even raised,
and in Hargrove it was stated that the constitutional provision
"should" forbid governmental immunity,5 0 but the case was not
ciecidbd on that basis. Although persuasive arguments can be made
to support the contention that governmental immunity is uncon-
stitutional,51 the main value of the arguments so far has been to
point out the natural repugnance of the common law system to
granting such immunity. Such use of the constitutionality argument
was effective in Hargrove. There the court stated: 52
If there is anything more than a sham to our constitutional guaran-
tee that the courts shall always be open to redress wrongs and to
our sense of justice that there shall be'a remedy for every wrong
committed, then certainly this basis for the rule [of immunity]
cannot be supported.
Such constitutional arguments undoubtedly add to the equities
which are essential to justify a reversal on public policy grounds.
The constitutionality of governmental immunity has also been
challenged occasionally on grounds that it violates both the equal
protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution.5 The courts have
thus far upheld the doctrine's constitutionality against these chal-
lenges, however, and on the basis of stare decisis at least, these
challenges would seem fruitless.
IV. PROSPECTIVE JUDICIAL ABROGATION
Holytz abolished the doctrine of governmental immunity pro-
spectively effective forty days after the decision, except that the
aecision would apply to the litigants themselves.54 The intent was
50 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).
5' See generally Note, 41 NEB. L. REV. 609 (1961). This article discusses
the constitutionality, under art. I, § 13 of the Nebraska Constitution, of
abolishing a common law right.
52 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).
53 Stocker v. City of Nashville, 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S.W.2d 339 (1939).
54 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis. 1962).
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to prevent an ensuing flood of litigation resulting from claims de-
cided under the old doctrine on which the statute of limitations
had not yet run. Such a method of abolishing the doctrine seems
both wise and practical and has become widely accepted.55
In analyzing the propriety of the courts, rather than the legis-
lature, abolishing such a well established doctrine; judge Currie,
concurring in Holytz,56 indicated that the court would probably
not interfere with any rule the legislature indicated should be re-
tained. Even though the Wisconsin legislature had specifically
disapproved the abrogation of governmental immunity, the Wiscon-
sin court reasoned that the legislators may have so voted because
they felt it was up to the courts to abolish a court-made rule.
57
However, many courts now merely follow the rule that they may
abolish any doctrine which they have initiated. 8 Such a rule avoids
the necessity of the courts having to rationalize to produce the de-
sired result such as was done by the Wisconsin court.
V. CONCLUSION
In a society which has increasingly realized that the law should
spread the burden of loss so that it can be absorbed by society
generally, municipal or governmental immunity seems out of place.
In most instances immunity will absolve from blame a tortious
municipality or other governing body which is financially in a
position to spread its losses, and impose upon an innocent victim
the crushing burden of individually bearing the loss inflicted upon
him by another's tort. In the analogous area of charitable immunity
most jurisdictions have already seen fit to abolish the immunity
myth.5 9 It would seem that the same policy arguments which have
55 See Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 292 (1961).
Note also the cases and articles cited therein.
56 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis. 1962) (separate opinion).
57 Ibid.
58 Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 234 P.2d 241 (1951); Hargrove v. Town
of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess
Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946); Avellone v. St. John's
Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.W.2d 410 (1956); Kojis v. Doctors
Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d 292 (1961).
59 President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Moats v. Sisters of Charity Providence, 13 Alaska 546
(1952); Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, 46 Del. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951);
Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247
(1946); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230
(1950). Rodkey, A Tale of a Law in Flux, 48 ILL. B.J. 644 (1960).
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led to the widespread destruction of charitable immunity, must
necessarily apply with equal force to governmental immunity. The
fact that governmental bodies are ever increasing their role in the
individual's daily life, makes it imperative that they be held liable
for their torts. Any expansion of governmental liability is a step
in the right direction, and it is submitted that the broadest possible
interpretation of Holytz would be most consistent with justice.
Merritt E. James '64
